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A. Shimony '~ as closing the circle. As is well known, this desideratum does not raise particular problems within classical physics for various reasons which have been lucidly pointed out by J. Bell: ~2~
Of course it is true that also in classical mechanics any isolation of a particular system from the world as a whole involves approximations, but at least one can envisage an accurate theory of the universe, to which the restricted account is an approximation, and moreover ... even a human observer is no trouble (in principle) in classical theory--it can be included in the system (in a schematic way) by postulating a psychophysical parallelism--i.e., by supposing his experience to be correlated with some function of the coordinates.
The situation is quite different in quantum mechanics, due to the specific peculiarities of the formalism. In particular, the linear nature of the Hilbert space description of the states of physical systems gives rise to well-known difficulties with macroscopic objects. The theory allows linear superpositions of macroscopically different states which render problematic to attribute definite properties to the systems they describe. In particular, as is well known, this situation occurs in measurement-like processes in which, after the system-apparatus interaction is over, one has, in general, a linear superposition of macroscopically distinguishable apparatus states.
Various solutions to this puzzling situation have been proposed; for our purposes it turns out not to be relevant to discuss their specific features and/or to comment on their pros and colas. What has to be pointed out is that now everybody agrees that one needs a reinterpretation or a modification of the formalism (such as breaking the von Neumann chain, introducing hidden variables, limiting measurability, or modifying the evolution law) which does not appreciably alter quantum predictions for microsystems but implies or makes it legitimate to state that macroobjects have definite macroproperties.
All these attempts attribute to positions a privileged role in the description of the macroscopic world. 4 This is quite natural since the definiteness, the particularity of the world of our experience, derives from our perceiving physical objects in definite places, and this is also why the prescriptions for establishing the psychophysical correspondence usually involve positions.
